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By Ariel E. Levite, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
“The ink has barely dried on the recent “Parameters” for a “Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action” (JCPOA), which itself is merely another interim step en route to a 
fully-fledged comprehensive agreement that may or may not be reached by the end 
of June and which, furthermore, even if concluded could (certainly if judged in 
light of the previous agreements with Iran) significantly deviate from its current 
composition. Already, predictably conflicting narratives between Iran and the US 
have emerged on what was agreed upon in Lausanne, raising serious questions 
whether the parameters of the deal as described will survive the ongoing negoti-
ations. Under these circumstances it is challenging to provide a definitive assess-
ment of the agreement in hand.  
Nevertheless, how does it look? In our judgment a great deal depends on one’s 
vantage point. If one is persuaded that the agreement averted imminent Iranian 
nuclearization and that such prospect would have inevitably unleashed war with 
Iran, then almost any deal seems preferable. If on the other hand you believe that 
Iran was not about to resume its pre-2003 Manhattan -type nuclear weapons pro-
gram and war was a remote prospect, then time need not have been of the essence 
for the P-5, which in turn casts the achieved outcome in much less favorable light 
the outcome achieved. 
Who got more out of the announced parameters? If we use the opening positions 
of the two sides as benchmarks, then Iran emerges the unquestionable winner. 
While agreeing to pay a price in temporarily restricting some and scaling back other 
aspects of its nuclear program Iran was able to get out of the P5+1 negotiators 
virtually all of the demands it has made since day one: sustained enrichment activ-
ity on a militarily significant scale in Natanz, scaling it up over time, continuation 
of the Arak research reactor, retention of the Fordow site as an active nuclear center 
with many centrifuges installed therein, exclusion of its missile activity from the 
negotiations, keeping its stocks of enriched uranium in Iran, sustained R&D 
activity on more advanced centrifuges. It was also able to refrain from committing 
to ratify the IAEA additional protocol (only to implement it) as well as to hold back 
from providing regular access to its military sites, or even fully implementing its 
Agreed Framework with the IAEA especially on Possible Military Dimension of its 
program.  Perhaps most ominously, Iran was able to break the linkage originally 
insisted upon by the US in the interim agreement (the JPOA) between its enrich-
ment activity and its energy needs.  Now, there is no apparent peaceful energy need 
against which to rationalize and evaluate Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran was also 
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able to get a firm commitment for early (simultaneous with its implementation or 
perhaps as Iran now claims far sooner) sanction relief as well as winding down of 
the UNSC resolutions pertaining to Iran.  Clearly the comparison to the opening US 
positions on all of these issues is not flattering. 
Another angle of judgment would be to assess the respective gains made (and 
losses incurred) by both sides in advancing their strategic objectives. Employing 
this yardstick naturally runs into some difficulty because the ultimate strategic 
goals of both sides (and, in fact, there were far more than two sides to these negoti-
ations) are not necessarily what they publicly profess. Still, one can reasonably 
assume that for Iran the key goals were to gain formal recognition for its status as 
an advanced nuclear hedger, to legitimately retain (and gradually upgrade) all the 
indigenous capabilities (in the fuel cycle, and nuclear weapons research and engi-
neering, and long-range delivery domains) necessary to make and use nuclear 
weapons, to shake loose of the punishing sanctions imposed on it, and to normal-
ize its international standing. For the current US administration the strategic goals 
seem to have been to codify restraint and constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities 
and more extensively monitor them in an effort to keep Iran for at least the next 10 
years more than  one year away from being able to make nuclear weapons to facili-
tate strategic realignment in its relations with Iran with an eye toward opening the 
way for more positive role for it to play in the Middle East, and perhaps also to 
enhance the prospect of transition toward a more moderate regime in Iran. Finally, 
the US administration obviously wanted to get this deal without alienating Con-
gress or seriously alarming its regional allies in the Middle East.   
Looked upon through these lenses the picture that emerges is far more nuanced, 
precisely because formulated this way the goals of the two sides do not seem 
incompatible. Iran was certainly able to accomplish virtually all of its goals through 
the JCOPA. In fact, the JCPOA’s explicit objective of keeping Iran one year from a 
breakout capability paradoxically and most dramatically underscores Iran’s stra-
tegic gain of a formal, legitimate strategic nuclear hedge with indigenous capabili-
ties to back it up. Similarly, sanctions relief and the commitment to normalize 
Iran’s status in the UNSC, re-legitimizes Iran’s nuclear position notwithstanding its 
dismal proliferation track record and longstanding defiance of UNSC resolutions 
and IAEA probes.  
 But the United States’ also has accomplished its strategic goals, albeit far more 
tentatively. Iran’s obligations in the JCPOA regarding its fuel-cycle activity would 
severely constraint the country’s capacity to  quickly produce  enough fissile mater-
ial for a bomb over the coming decade and would make it considerably more diffi-
cult for it to do so clandestinely.  The impact on the fortunes of domestic forces in 
Iran is impossible to predict with confidence, though it is true that the more pro-
gressive elements in Iran have reacted enthusiastically while others seem at the 
very least far more reserved.   Regarding Iran’s regional behavior, a strong case can 
be made that the deal would empower Iran financially and politically embolden its 
extremists (especially within the IRGC) to pursue even more aggressively its sub-
versive role in the region. But, conversely, it might also be argued that Iran would 
now turn inwards to address its domestic woes, tame its regional behavior and 
operate more cooperatively with the US.  
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Which brings us to the two more contentious elements of the deal: its intrusive 
verification provisions and its mechanism for reimposing sanctions (“snap-
back”).Verification and sanctions relief have been extremely contentious in the 
negotiations because both sides profoundly distrust the sincerity of each other’s 
intentions. The compromise struck here would not be ideal for either, but on 
balance clearly tends to favor the Iranians. Removing the anchor of both the 
sanctions and verification mechanism from their current grounding in UNSC 
resolutions will make re-imposition of sanctions through the UNSC very tough to 
accomplish.  This point is made abundantly clear by the JCPOA’s failure to mention 
that China and Russia support such provisions. Similarly, the effective application 
of a rigorous IAEA verification scheme that goes well beyond standard IAEA Com-
prehensive Safeguards Agreements hinges on many conditions, every one of which 
would be difficult to meet. To begin with the IAEA (as its Director General has 
recently made clear) would require a significant budget increase for this purpose, 
retooling of its inspectors, and also a new mandate for the mission from its Board of 
Governors. But above all it would also require exemplary collaboration from Iran.  
Yet, transparency and cooperation with inspections are areas where Iran’s track 
record both before and after 2003 have been sorely inadequate. Iran consistently 
defied key aspects of scores of UNSC and IAEA BOG resolutions. So unless explicitly 
anchored in UNSC and IAEA BOG resolutions, the prospects of an adequate verifi-
cation arrangement look dim.  
A daunting challenge would pertain to benchmarking Iran’s past activities.  It is 
especially important to have an inventory of Iran’s stockpile of centrifuges and 
components that could be used to make more of them, and also to understand 
activities Iran has already conducted related to nuclear weaponization (developing 
the capability to package the fissile material into a nuclear explosive device and 
miniaturizing it so that it would fit into a missile warhead). Both categories of past 
activities affect Iran’s future capacity to make nuclear weapons, either by breaking 
out of an agreement or waiting until it lapses.  The more that is known about these 
activities, the easier it will be to detect their recurrence and to identify them as new, 
and thereby to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons.  
Another major concern is the IAEA's resolve and capacity to pursue over time 
intelligence-driven leads on dubious Iranian activities, not merely in the fuel cycle 
domain but also on the weaponization side. If its past behavior is any guide, the 
IAEA, as its former Director General Elbradei has repeatedly stated, would refrain 
from providing the US with a smoking gun which it could then use to justify a mili-
tary attack on Iran.  Furthermore, the IAEA, as its current Director General Amano 
has repeatedly stated, is prudently determined to painstakingly authenticate 
through its own sources every intelligence lead it gets on Iran before leveraging 
such information against Iran.  Under the best of circumstances, therefore, turning 
intelligence into inspections and verification actions by the IAEA will be a very 
challenging and time-consuming process even under the best of circumstances.  
The process will be even slower and more uncertain when some states within the 
IAEA Board of Governors resist the IAEA Secretariat’s application of the State Level 
Concept (a holistic approach for upgrading the implementation of IAEA Safeguards 
by looking comprehensively at states’ nuclear activities).   
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This is a sobering analysis when one realizes that the IAEA is the sole legitimate 
watchdog over Iran’s program and Iran retains at a minimum a one-year breakout 
capacity. It is even more troublesome when one understands the serious legitimacy 
challenge the US (already haunted by the Iraq precedent) would encounter were it 
to consider responding unilaterally to Iranian nuclear transgressions before the 
IAEA has come out corroborating them. Implicitly acknowledging this concern Pre-
sident Obama has recently advanced the concept mentioned in the JCPOA para-
meters of setting up a dispute resolution process to oversee and presumably arbi-
trate disagreements over the performance of JCPOA commitments. Yet as the JCPOA 
makes clear this yet to be fully flashed out mechanism is not Iran focused but 
rather symmetrical and open to all the JCPOA. Consequently it could end up creat-
ing as many problems as it solves, making it dubious that it could remedy rather 
than aggravate the abovementioned verification concerns. 
So where does all this leave us? With an agreement that unless fixed would set 
back the cause of non-proliferation by setting a precedent where even a state that 
has systematically cheated on the NPT and IAEA Safeguards, and has had a nuclear 
weapons program and defied successive UNSC and IAEA BOG resolutions, is then 
granted formal legitimacy in retaining and even augmenting nuclear capabilities 
that give it a rather advanced hedge toward nuclear weapons. Worse still, Iran gets 
this status without even a remote justification for any of its fuel-cycle activities as 
necessary for an exclusively peaceful nuclear energy program.  Iran is not required 
to fulfill any other attributes of normal civilian nuclear energy programs in the 
areas of safety, security, or liability. It has not even been asked to commit to trans-
form its program to conform to the patterns of other purely peaceful programs. 
Little surprise then that such precedent and package, as well as negotiating track 
record is hardly reassuring to those US allies living in the Middle East. 
We now enter the next phase of the negotiations that hopefully will lead, pre-
sumably over the next three months, to a true Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 
Obviously many details remain to be worked out. But beyond getting these details 
right, what is really needed are conceptual changes that would reinforce a compre-
hensive agreements’ chances of credibly and irreversibly defusing the acute chal-
lenge presented by the Iranian program. These changes should not stand in the 
way of operationalizing and finalizing the parameters in the JCOPA. In fact quite 
the reverse, they could enhance the chances that a JCPOA, once concluded, would 
actually reassure its open-minded skeptics in Congress as well as among the US 
allies in the Middle East and beyond.  
First, sanctions relief must be tied to actual implementation of Iran's various 
nuclear obligations under the JCPOA as well as under IAEA Comprehensive Safe-
guards, the Additional Protocol and the IAEA-Iran Agreed Framework for Coope-
ration. Even under the best of circumstances these steps would not happen over-
night. Yet Iran emboldened by its accomplishments to date and seeing President 
Obama’s credibility already so heavily vested in the deal, might be even more 
strongly inclined to bring things to a head over the sanctions issue. Iran already 
claims that sanctions relief should be undertaken by the UNSC in the first phase of 
the JCPOA implementation rather than after it has met all of its obligations therein. 
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Iranian officials threaten retaliation if this would not be the case. Budging or even 
fudging on this issue is a sure recipe for a failed deal.  
Just as importantly, Iran, as it has previously done in the decade-long nuclear 
diplomacy over its program (and practically every other deal it has struck), is 
bound to test to the limit every other obligation it assumes.  
A similar resolve must thus be manifest in the Congressional, UNSC and IAEA 
BOG resolutions to monitor and uphold Iran to the US understanding of its JCPOA 
obligations in order to ascertain that Iran's leeway for encroaching on the JCPOA is 
minimized, thereby enhancing the chances that it actually delivers on its promised 
benefits.  
Additionally, the US and its European allies must not compromise on retaining a 
“snap back” mechanism for sanctions that the UNSC would be relieving.  If Russia 
and China cannot be brought around to support it, the whole “snap back” mechan-
ism would be in great jeopardy.  At a minimum, the P-3 would have to resist any 
other UNSC resolution that will merely “endorse the JCPOA and urge its full 
implementation”.  Without some clear and rapidly applicable credible mechanism 
to restore massive pressure on Iran if it does not uphold an agreement, a JCPOA 
endorsed by the Security Council would tempt those in Iran who want to press on 
with building up the country’s nuclear weapon option.   
Third, as alluded to above, Iran’s interlocutors should insist that the Iranian 
nuclear program adopt agreements and practices that all other peaceful nuclear 
programs have. To be fair this should not be done in a manner that singles out Iran. 
In order to stem a proliferation cascade that could easily occur as a result of the 
unhelpful precedent set with Iran, the international community must apply a 
minimal yardstick for welcoming any state to enjoy access to nuclear technology 
under Article IV of the NPT. The UNSC should insist that  Iran, like any country 
claiming the benefits of its “inalienable right” under the treaty, must ratify and 
implement in good faith the cornerstone international conventions in the three 
areas of safety, security, and liability (CNS, CPPNM, and CSC or, Vienna or Paris 
conventions). 
Fourth, the IAEA must be authorized (both by the UNSC and its own BOG) to 
inspect the Iranian nuclear program in a manner that would enhance its ability to 
assess with confidence the orientation of Iran’s nuclear program, and do so with far 
lower dependence on externally supplied intelligence. The IAEA normally takes a 
“2C” approach to safeguards, focusing on Completeness and Correctness of decla-
rations. Forthwith in Iran, and in the future elsewhere as well, it must also look for 
an additional 3Cs: Compatibility, Comprehensiveness, and Coherence. A “5 Cs” 
model would be necessary to build confidence that Iran’s post-deal nuclear pro-
gram is exclusively peaceful, and as such would be invaluable to apply as standard 
operating procedure for the IAEA. 
Compatibility refers to the degree to which activities undertaken are indeed 
commensurate with their stated peaceful purposes – including the sequencing and 
scale of activities, economic rationale underlying them, safety, security, and liabil-
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ity provisions governing the nuclear activity etc.  Activities or conditions that are 
not compatible with purely peaceful purposes should be deemed to indicate a pos-
sible nuclear-weapons orientation, inviting more rigorous transparency to clarify 
questions. Comprehensiveness refers to the extent that additional activities under-
taken by the state that go beyond the scope of safeguards (and certainly beyond 
those declared to the IAEA) such as in the weaponization and militarization 
domains fit with the typical features we would expect to see in a purely peaceful 
nuclear program (in practice an extension of the original IAEA work on the “Physi-
cal Model”– an attempt to identify, describe and characterize various components 
of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing a technical tool to aid enhanced information 
analysis, now constituting an integral part of the on-going Safeguards’ State evalu-
ation process).  Finally, Coherence refers to the extent that the activities under-
taken fit into an alarming pattern by being both interconnected and realizing 
many/all the known elements necessary for a nuclear weapons program. 
While highly desirable it is neither necessary nor feasible that all of these con-
ceptual changes be reflected in a final JCPOA.  But those elements that could not be 
accommodated within the JCPOA should make their way into US Congressional leg-
islation, the new UNSC resolution, and IAEA BOG decisions endorsing the JCPOA. 
And even if these additional elements did get eventually incorporated into the 
JCPOA these institutions would be prudent to reinforce them when they inevitably 
take up and act on the JCPOA in order to facilitate its implementation.    
The US Congress would be well advised to go along with the JCPOA but attach to 
it provisions (including the abovementioned parameters) that the Congress would 
look to see satisfied as it oversees implementation of the JCPOA. It would be highly 
beneficial if the Congress were to go further and authorize relief of US sanctions on 
Iran if Iran meets these terms, and to volunteer U.S. peaceful nuclear assistance 
and other non-threatening aid to Iran so long as it truly reorients its nuclear pro-
gram. By the same token, it would be appropriate for Congress to explicitly affirm 
President’s Obama commitment to use all the means at the US disposal to prevent 
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons were Iran to move in the opposite direction.  
In the final analysis one ought to see in the agreed (?) parameters for the JCPOA 
recently announced in Lausanne no less but also no more than the first step in a 
long and arduous way to defuse the Iranian nuclear challenge and redress the 
acute threat it has been posing to the global nuclear order as well as to regional 
stability in the Middle East. For the JCPOA to have a chance to live up to its promise 
and genuinely provide the well sought after turning point it must be both meticu-
lously applied and significantly reinforced by complementary measures. One or the 
other by itself would not do. Together they might, and if this is indeed the course 
ultimately chosen its potential benefits would greatly outweigh its risks making it 
worthy of our full support. 
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